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I.

Introduction

In a recent speech, National Security Advisor John Bolton
delivered remarks on “Protecting American Constitutionalism and
Sovereignty from International Threats.” 1 In his remarks, Bolton
announced a new American policy vis-à-vis the International Criminal
Court (ICC or Court). According to Bolton, the ICC “has been
ineffective, unaccountable, and indeed, outright dangerous.” 2 While
Bolton, and others in the Trump Administration, are at liberty to
craft new policies, it is important that such policies be based on
accurate facts, and on an accurate understanding of the law. This
Article will highlight factual errors from Bolton’s remarks, and it will
criticize some of Bolton’s arguments as misguided and contrary to the
United States’ interests. In order to do so, this Article will first
provide a brief background on the establishment and jurisdictional
mechanisms of the ICC (Part II). Next, this Article will analyze
Bolton’s remarks and the new American policy, announced therein,
regarding the ICC (Part III). Finally, this Article will propose how
the United States could engage more constructively with the ICC, and
*

Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Enrichment,
Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. The author would like to thank the
organizers of the Frederick K. Cox International Law Center’s 2018
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1.

John Bolton, Nat’l Sec. Advisor, Speech at the Federalist Society in
Washington
D.C.
(Sept.
10,
2018),
available
at
https://www.justsecurity.org/60674/national-security-adviser-johnbolton-remarks-international-criminal-court/ [https://perma.cc/NP6P2USM] [hereinafter “Bolton’s Remarks”].

2.

Id.
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how such engagement would advance American interests (Part IV).
This Article will conclude that the newly announced policy vis-à-vis
the ICC will be detrimental to the United States’ interests in the
global community, as well as destructive for the global fight against
impunity.

II. Background on the ICC
The ICC is the only permanent international criminal tribunal.3
Its Statute (“Rome Statute”) was negotiated in 1998, and the Court
became operational in 2002. 4 The ICC is located at The Hague, and
the Rome Statute provides that the Court has prospective
jurisdiction, starting in 2002. 5 The Court can properly exercise
jurisdiction over situations where crimes have been committed on the
territory of an ICC state party, or where crimes have been committed
by a national of an ICC state party. 6 In terms of subject-matter
jurisdiction, the Court can prosecute individuals accused of four main
categories of crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity, crimes of
aggression, and war crimes. 7 Starting in 2017, the crime of aggression
was added to the Court’s Rome Statute, although negotiations
surrounding the addition were contentious and resulted in a complex
mechanism, whereby states can opt out of jurisdiction over this
crime. 8 Cases can appear before the ICC in three different ways: the
United Nations Security Council can refer a case to the ICC
prosecutor; any state party to the ICC can refer a case to the
prosecutor; or, the prosecutor can initiate an investigation on her
own. 9 Thus far, the ICC has investigated or prosecuted over twentysix individuals and eleven situations. 10
3.

INT’L
CRIM.
COURT,
[https://perma.cc/4LWM-EAYN].

https://www.icc-cpi.int/about

4.

Id.

5.

Id.

6.

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 12, Jul. 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. This pre-condition to the
exercise of ICC’s jurisdiction does not apply to cases which are referred
to the Court by the United Nations Security Council. Id.

7.

Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 5.

8.

For a detailed discussion of negotiations regarding the addition of the
crime of aggression to the Rome Statute, see Jennifer Trahan, From
Kampala to New York—The Final Negotiations to Activate the
Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court over the Crime of
Aggression, 18 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 197 (2018).

9.

Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 13.

10.

Situations and Cases, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/#
[https://perma.cc/68EV-NVZP].
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The ICC’s reach is further limited by two conditions related to
admissibility of cases: gravity and complementarity. 11 As it will be
discussed below, in order for a case to be admissible before the ICC,
such a case needs to involve crimes of sufficient gravity; moreover,
national jurisdictions can preempt an ICC prosecution, by notifying
the Court that they are able and willing to investigate the relevant
case: the principle of complementarity. 12 Thus, these principles—
gravity and complementarity—pose an additional admissibility hurdle
for potential ICC prosecutions.

III. Bolton’s Remarks and the New American Policy on
the ICC
National Security Advisor John Bolton delivered a speech on
September 10, 2018, in which he announced a new United States’
policy vis-à-vis the ICC. 13 Bolton’s remarks contained several errors
regarding the ICC’s structure, jurisdictional reach, and internal
accountability mechanisms. This section will outline some of these
errors. In addition, this section will highlight some of Bolton’s
remarks that contained new policy guidelines vis-à-vis the ICC, where
such guidelines are misguided and detrimental to United States’
interests.
Bolton argued in his speech that “[t]he ICC and its Prosecutor
had been granted potentially enormous, essentially unaccountable
powers, and alongside numerous other glaring and significant flaws,
the International Criminal Court constituted an assault on the
constitutional rights of the American People and the sovereignty of
the United States.” 14 It is incorrect that the ICC and its Prosecutor
have “enormous” or “unaccountable powers.” The ICC’s jurisdiction
is limited temporally as well as rationae materiae: the Court has
prospective jurisdiction, starting in 2002, and it can only exercise
jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.15
The crime of aggression was recently added to the Court’ Statute, but
the addition was complex and will require states to “opt-in” to
11.

Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 17.

12.

Id; see also David Tolbert, International Criminal Law: Past and
Future, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1281, 1293 (2009) (discussing the principle
of complementarity and its implications for the International Criminal
Court).

13.

Bolton’s Remarks, supra note 1.

14.

Id.

15.

Rome Statute, supra note 6, arts. 5, 11. As mentioned above, the crime
of aggression has been added to the Rome Statute in 2017, although
states can elect to opt out of jurisdiction over the crime of aggression.
Trahan, supra note 8.
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jurisdiction over this new crime. 16 In addition, the ICC is constrained
by
the
application
of
principles
of
gravity
and
complementarity. 17 The ICC was established to exercise its
jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international
concern. Article 17(1)(d) of the Rome Statute provides that a case is
inadmissible before the ICC if the case is not of sufficient gravity to
justify further action by the Court. 18 Thus, cases which involve less
“serious” crimes may not satisfy the ICC’s gravity threshold and may
never be prosecuted before this Court. 19 In addition, the ICC is not
supposed to interfere with national prosecutions, and the Court
should only prosecute suspects if a state is not able or willing to
prosecute. 20 According to Article 17(1)(a) of the Rome Statute, a case
is inadmissible when it is being investigated or prosecuted by a state
that has jurisdiction over it, unless the state is genuinely unwilling or
unable to carry out the investigation or prosecution. 21 In other words,
if a state is able and willing to prosecute an individual, that state
should be given the opportunity to do so, and the ICC should step
away. 22 Thus, in light of the Court’s jurisdictional limitations as well
as important admissibility requirements, it is inaccurate to claim that
the ICC has “enormous” powers.
Moreover, it is incorrect to claim that the ICC has
“unaccountable” powers. The Assembly of States Parties, consisting
of states which are members of the ICC, is an important
accountability mechanism over the Court. 23 For example, judges can
be removed by a two-thirds vote of states parties to the Rome
Statute, and a prosecutor can be removed by a majority vote of states
parties. 24 Thus, to claim that the ICC somehow wields super-powers
which transcend any accountability is simply false.
16.

For a detailed account of negotiations to add the crime of aggression to
the Rome Statute, as well as the complex opt-out procedure available to
ICC member states regarding jurisdiction over the crime of aggression,
see Trahan, supra note 8.

17.

Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 17.

18.

Id.

19.

For a detailed analysis of the ICC’s application of the gravity threshold,
see Margaret M. DeGuzman, The International Criminal Court’s
Gravity Jurisprudence at Ten, 12 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 475
(2013).

20.

Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 17.

21.

Id.

22.

Tolbert, supra note 12, at 1288-89.

23.

Assembly of States Parties, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/asp
[https://perma.cc/QS2Q-5QLG].

24.

Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 46.
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Finally, it is unclear why the establishment of the ICC constitutes
a constitutional and sovereignty assault against the United
States. The ICC is a treaty-based body; any state, including the
United States, is free to join or not to join this treaty. If the United
States chooses to join the ICC, or any other treaty, potential conflicts
with the U.S. Constitution would be resolved through the Supremacy
Clause, which establishes the primacy of the Constitution over any
inconsistent treaty obligations. 25 Thus, it is surprising and misleading
to claim that the negotiation of a new treaty, like the ICC, is
somehow a threat to the United States’ sovereignty or the role of its
Constitution.
Bolton also argued that, “the Court’s structure is contrary to
fundamental American principles, including checks and balances on
authority and the separation of powers…. The International Criminal
Court, however, melds two of these branches together: the judicial
and the executive. In the ICC structure, the executive branch—the
Office of the Prosecutor—is an organ of the Court. The Framers of
our Constitution considered such a melding of powers unacceptable
for our own government, and we should certainly not accept it in the
ICC. “ 26 This is a curious argument: while it may be true that the
ICC does not espouse the same separation of powers structure that
the United States government does, the United States cannot possibly
expect that every treaty-based organization adopt American
governance principles. Multilateral treaties bind multiple nations
together and often adopt compromise positions and the “lowest
common denominator” of norms; 27 it is not reasonable to expect that
treaties
would
replicate
United
States’
constitutional
structures. 28 And,
such
replication
is
not
constitutionally
mandated. The United States can become a member of various
treaty-based bodies, so long as its obligations under such treaty
mechanisms do not directly conflict with the Constitution. Nothing
in the ICC Statute would create such a constitutional conflict. Thus,
Bolton’s argument here is both surprising and unsupported by the
Constitution.
Moreover, Bolton argued that the ICC “claims ‘automatic
jurisdiction,’ meaning that it can prosecute individuals even if their
25.

U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (“This Constitution, and the laws of the United
States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made,
or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall
be the supreme law of the land.”).

26.

Bolton’s Remarks, supra note 1.

27.

See, e.g., GLOBAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY
143 (P. Bilgin, et al., eds. 2010) (describing the “lowest common
denominator” in multilateral treaty negotiations).

28.

Id.
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own governments have not recognized, signed, or ratified the
treaty.” 29 This is not true either: the ICC does not have automatic
jurisdiction. Article 12 of the Court’s Rome Statute posits that a
precondition to the court’s exercise of jurisdiction is that the alleged
crimes be committed by a national of a state party, or on the
territory of a state party (or if a state accepts the court’s
jurisdiction). 30 Thus, while the ICC may be able to prosecute
nationals of a non-party state, 31 this situation is far from automatic,
and may only occur if such nationals commit crimes on the territory
of a state party.
Bolton next claimed that the ICC Prosecutor’s request to
investigate Americans for alleged detainee abuse in Afghanistan is “an
utterly unfounded, unjustifiable investigation.” 32 This investigation is
not unfounded in and of itself; the investigation will permit the
Prosecutor to ascertain enough facts to decide whether to go forward
with any possible prosecutions. Moreover, the investigation is not
unjustifiable, as it falls within the Court’s mandate, and as potential
prosecutions would satisfy the Court’s temporal and subject-matter
jurisdiction (the alleged crimes took place after 2002, on the territory
of a state party– Afghanistan). If the Prosecutor determined that
admissibility requirements, such as gravity and complementarity,
were not met, she would not proceed with the case. Thus, the
possible investigation of crimes in Afghanistan, which may involve
American nationals as perpetrators, is not “unfounded” or
“unjustifiable” by any judicial or prosecutorial standards.
Bolton proceeded to criticize the ICC because it “claims
jurisdiction over crimes that have disputed and ambiguous definitions,
exacerbating the Court’s unfettered powers. The definitions of
crimes, especially crimes of aggression, are vague and subject to wideranging interpretation by the ICC.” 33 This claim is also inaccurate:
the ICC Statute specifically defines the crimes over which the Court
has jurisdiction, 34 and the interpretation and application of these
definitions is appropriately left in the hands of the Court’s judiciary,
in the same manner that the interpretation and application of
29.

Bolton’s Remarks, supra note 1.

30.

Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 12.

31.

Id. at art. 12(3).

32.

Bolton’s Remarks, supra note 1.

33.

Id.

34.

See Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 6-8 (specifically listing crimes
which are within the Court’s jurisdiction. Articles 6, 7, and 8 define the
crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. Thus, it is
incorrect to claim that the crimes which are within the Court’s
jurisdiction are ill-defined or vague).
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domestic statutes is bestowed upon domestic judiciaries. Bolton’s
claim that the definitions of crimes within the ICC’s Statute are
“disputed,” “ambiguous,” or “vague” is unsupported within the
scholarly community, and unsupported by evidence from the Court’s
negotiating record. 35 The ICC Rome Statute was negotiated over
weeks of strenuous academic, strategic and political debates; the
Statute’s content is the result of impressive compromise and
expertise. 36 While some definitions of crimes may have been the
subject of controversy and academic dispute, the end result was
agreed upon by all member states, and has resulted in a Statute
which is clear and unambiguous. 37 In addition, customary norms of
International Criminal Law espouse many of the same definitions of
crimes and principles of law which are enshrined in the Rome
Statute. 38 In sum, Bolton was wrong in his claim that the ICC
contains vague or ambiguous definitions of crimes.
In addition, Bolton argued that the ICC would somehow claim
universal jurisdiction. ”The next obvious step is to claim complete,
universal jurisdiction: the ability to prosecute anyone, anywhere for
vague crimes identified by The Hague’s bureaucrats.” 39 There is
nothing in the ICC’s Statute to support this conclusion, and while the
Rome Statute negotiating record reveals that different states held
different views regarding the Court’s reach and structure, it is false to
claim that any serious intentions existed to provide the Court with
universal jurisdiction over “anyone” or over “vague crimes.” 40

35.

For a detailed discussion of the Rome Statute negotiations, see FANNY
BENEDETTI ET AL., NEGOTIATING THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
(2013); see also Phillippe Kirsch & John T. Holmes, The Rome
Conference on an International Criminal Court: The Negotiating
Process, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 2 (1999) (discussing the negotiating process
for the establishment of an International Criminal Court).

36.

Id.

37.

For a detailed academic discussion of the various substantive provisions
of the ICC’s Rome Statute, see Antonio Cassese, The Statute of the
International Criminal Court: Some Preliminary Reflections, 10 EUR J.
INT’L L. 144 (1999).

38.

For a discussion of the relationship between the Rome Statute and
customary international law, see, e.g., Jan Wouters, The Obligation to
Prosecute International Law Crimes, https://www.law.kuleuven.be/iir/
nl/onderzoek/opinies/obligationtoprosecute.pdf; see also Leila Nadya
Sadat, Custom, Codification and Some Thoughts About the Relationship
Between the Two: Article 10 of the ICC Statute, 49 DEPAUL L. Rᴇᴠ.
909 (2000) (discussing the role of Article 10 in international law).

39.

Bolton’s Remarks, supra note 1.

40.

For a discussion of the ICC Rome Statute’s negotiating history, see
BENEDETTI ET AL., supra note 35.
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Finally, some of Bolton’s claims were, while not completely
factually inaccurate, misguided and contrary to United States’
interests. First, Bolton claimed that the ICC is ineffective, as it has
spent too much money, has prosecuted few individuals, and has not
deterred the commission of atrocities in places such as the Democratic
Republic of Congo, Sudan, Libya, or Syria. 41 This may be a fair
criticism of the Court, but accepting such criticism could lead one to
adopt a pro-ICC policy: to support the Court, and to ensure that the
Court has better funding and better opportunities to truly deter the
commission of atrocities, through its investigative and prosecutorial
mechanisms. 42 This approach would benefit both the Court and all
states which are committed to principles of accountability and
individual criminal responsibility (United States should be positioned
as a leader within this group of countries).
Second, Bolton claimed that the ICC is superfluous, because of
superior United States’ judicial and ethical standards. 43 According to
Bolton, we do not need the ICC because the United States can handle
its own investigations much better. 44 Bolton argued that the ICC’s
application of the complementarity principle is “farcical” and that the
Prosecutor will decide which investigation to pursue based on political
motives. 45 While the ICC has been criticized on complementarity
grounds (in the Libya case in particular), there is nothing to suggest
that the Prosecutor does not consider complementarity issues
seriously in each case that has been initiated with the Court. 46 And,
even accepting that the United States’ judicial system is superior to
the ICC, one could imagine a situation where the United States is
unwilling to investigate its own wrongdoing; the ICC’s role is to act in
such situations and to provide justice and accountability against
41.

Bolton’s Remarks, supra note 1.

42.

See, e.g., Jane Stromseth, Why Bolton’s Assault on the ICC is Not in
SECURITY
(Sept.
14,
2018),
the
U.S.
Interest,
JUST
https://www.justsecurity.org/60743/boltons-assault-icc-u-s-interests/
[https://perma.cc/V39Y-55MM] (arguing that “the ICC is a very
imperfect institution, with many limitations and challenges. But it
should not be blamed for the failures that stem from lack of support for
its work or matters outside its jurisdiction”).

43.

Bolton’s Remarks, supra note 1.

44.

Id.

45.

Id.

46.

See, e.g., Jennifer Trahan, Guest Post: A Complementarity Challenge
Gone Awry - The ICC and the Libya Warrants, OPINIOJURIS (Sept. 4,
2015), http://opiniojuris.org/2015/09/04/guest-post-a-complementaritychallenge-gone-awry-the-icc-and-the-libya-warrants/
[https://perma.cc/8NWQ-XGRF] (discussing ICC jurisdiction in the
Libya case).
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perpetrators whose home countries choose to shield them. 47 As
several commentators have already pointed out, the best thing that
the United States can do, if faced with the potential ICC
investigation, is to ensure that American perpetrators of potential
abuses are thoroughly investigated in the United States’ military or
criminal system. 48 In this manner, the principle of complementarity
would preclude the ICC from continuing to investigate, because the
United States would have demonstrated its willingness and ability to
prosecute on its own.
Last but not least, most troubling in Bolton’s speech was his
threat against those who cooperate with the ICC. ”We will respond
against the ICC and its personnel to the extent permitted by U.S.
law. We will ban its judges and prosecutors from entering the United
States. We will sanction their funds in the U.S. financial system, and,
we will prosecute them in the U.S. criminal system. We will do the
same for any company or state that assists an ICC investigation of
Americans.” 49 It is absolutely within the United States’ sovereignty
to refuse to issue visas/entry to ICC officials who may be foreign
nationals (although this would be terrible policy). 50 However, it is
simply unbelievable to announce that the United States would
prosecute ICC officials, and other companies or states who assist the
ICC in the U.S. domestic system. ICC officials are highly respected
experts in international criminal law: judges, prosecutors,
investigators, and other individuals who have committed their careers
to the pursuit of international justice. Those who assist or have
assisted the ICC include our colleagues—the most prominent experts
in international criminal law who have provided advice and expertise
to the Court. What crimes have such individuals committed under
47.

See Stromseth, supra note 42 (“Working to build stronger accountability
for mass atrocities - in national courts when possible, in hybrid courts,
and before the ICC - together can reinforce the fundamental
prohibitions against atrocity crimes and bolster prospects for their
prevention.”).

48.

Id.; see also Milena Sterio, Commentary on John Bolton’s Speech
Regarding New American Policy on the International Criminal Court,
INTLAWGRRLS
(Sept.
10,
2018),
https://ilg2.org/2018/09/10/commentary-on-john-boltons-speechregarding-new-american-policy-on-the-international-criminal-court/
[https://perma.cc/85MW-K42N] (discussing the factual errors within
Bolton’s Remarks on “Protecting American Constitutionalism and
Sovereignty from International Threats”).

49.

Bolton’s Remarks, supra note 1.

50.

Know Your Rights: What to do When Encountering Law Enforcement
at Airports and Other Ports of Entry into the U.S., ACLU,
https://www.aclu.org/know-your-rights/what-do-when-encounteringlaw-enforcement-airports-and-other-ports-entry-us
[https://perma.cc/6FTD-LBP9].
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United States law? And, how would such prosecutions (even if
grounded in U.S. law) affect the United States’ role in international
relations and in the world community? John Bolton’s speech is both
factually inaccurate as well as misguided, and a new American policy
vis-à-vis the ICC, built on Bolton’s remarks, will be detrimental to
our own interests and our position in the global community.

IV. Conclusion: A Better Policy Vis-à-vis the ICC:
Constructive Engagement
As opposed to stating that the ICC is “dead to us,” as Bolton
did, 51 it would be in the United States’ interests to constructively
engage with the Court and to support its mandate. While the United
States is not a state party to the Rome Statute, 52 nothing precludes
the United States from working to support the work of the Court, in
order to foster the global goal of ending impunity. The United States
could adopt a pro-ICC policy, which would allow the United States to
work with the Court—through funding and other investigative and
prosecutorial support. In addition, the United States could encourage
other countries to support the ICC in a similar fashion. The United
States could also work with the Court as well as with other national
jurisdictions to build prosecutorial capacity over atrocity crimes, as
well as to enhance prospects for their prevention. Such constructive
engagement with the court would not undermine United States’
interests, and would advance both American and global interests in
ending impunity and deterring the commission of atrocity crimes. As
Jane Stromseth has argued,
We can protect U.S. personnel and U.S. interests effectively
without assaulting and undercutting the possibilities for justice
for victims of egregious atrocities that the ICC can offer, or its
work in catalyzing meaningful accountability at the national
level—the primary and most important foundation for justice
and the rule of law. 53

In sum, Bolton’s newly announced ICC policy is based on
erroneous facts. It is misguided, and contrary to the United States’
national security interests and to the global goals of justice.

51.

Bolton’s Remarks, supra note 1.

52.

The States Parties to the Rome Statute, ICC, https://asp.icccpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/pages
/the%20states%20parties%20to%20the%20rome%20statute.aspx
[https://perma.cc/2W6G-X3VM].

53.

Stromseth, supra note 42.
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